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Abstract 
Reasoning is a fundamental process in design activity, and it provides a way to understand design 
behaviour. Theories and models of design propose reasoning that follows abductive-deductive patterns. At 
the micro-level, these patterns are untested. This study analyses verbal reasoning patterns at the micro-
level for group idea generation using protocol analyses of concurrent verbalisations from five design teams 
with industry participants. The results show that reasoning in design activity across 218 ideas follows 
general patterns of abductive-deductive reasoning. At the individual idea level, the reasoning patterns are 
disorderly and enter into micro-patterns of inference. The study concludes that understanding reasoning at 
early-stage idea generation processes is indicative of the mental models and abductive-deductive reasoning 
that are prevalent in design activity. 
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Reasoning is at the heart of design activity, and it determines how humans respond to situations in every 
aspect of their lives (Johnson-Laird, 2009). The reasoning of designers consists of trains of thought, 
including deliberation, argumentation and making logical inferences (Rittel, 1987), and it is central to 
understanding and supporting design activity. 
Drawing on the works of Peirce (1931), inferences in design are described as being driven by abductive 
reasoning (Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993), meaning that design activity begins by hypothesising desired 
outcomes or functions, and it moves towards proposing forms and structures that can realise such desired 
outcomes. Pertaining to the processes involved in design, different models describe the activity as 
comprising stages that begin by formulating initial hypotheses to propose desired functions followed by the 
generation of probable behaviours and solutions to such functions, involving evaluation and reflection on 
which solutions are suitable for the desired function (March, 1976; Schön, 1991). Such processes involve 
both abductive, deductive and inductive reasoning; they are learning processes that do not follow strict 
abductive-deductive-inductive sequences (March, 1976).  
Rittel (1987) describes design activity as a disorderly process that is inherently argumentative in its 
reasoning. Design activity involves the negotiation among the different perspectives and desires of those 
involved in a design process (Bucciarelli, 2002). Hence, design is understood as a social process through 
which solutions emerge as the result of argumentation among the different perspectives and values of 
those involved in the process. In such processes, reasoning is reflected by the deliberation and arguing 
among designers where language plays a performative role in that it enacts and constitutes design (Dong, 
2007). 
However, the related empirical studies of the reasoning and structure of design activity have in common 
that they concern design activity in relation to the proposition, detailing and evaluation of objects through 
inference by applying ‘design thinking’. Such analyses are either performed conceptually (Dorst, 2011; 
March, 1976; Roozenburg, 1993) or they rely on verbal reports that (post)rationalise the activity 
undertaken (e.g., Galle, 1996b; Lloyd & Scott, 1994), making them unsuitable for capturing the 
argumentative aspects of reasoning processes as they occur in situations that are contentious and 
influenced by diverging values, objectives and desires (Bucciarelli, 2002; Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002).  
Consequently, the study sets out to empirically analyse reasoning in a verbal form as it occurs among 
people engaged in design activity. This necessitates combining a tradition for describing a logic of design 
through formal reasoning (March, 1976; Roozenburg, 1993) with notions of design as enacted through 
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language (Dong, 2007) among individuals with differing intentions and perceptions (Bucciarelli, 2002). The 
study aims to contribute with a novel analysis and perspective on empirical reasoning in design and its 
implications for design in practice. 
1 THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 LOGICAL REASONING 
Since the works of C.S. Peirce in the mid-20th century and earlier, logical reasoning has been formulated as 
being deductive, inductive or abductive (Peirce, 1980). These reasoning types define three distinctly 
different ways of drawing conclusions from premises. 
Deductive reasoning is self-referencing as it allows for the reaching of a conclusion based on the logical 
implications of two or more propositions asserted to be true (Magnani, 1995; March, 1976; Reichertz, 
2010). Consequently, deduction is justificational as the premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion 
(Schurz, 2007). An example of deductive reasoning is as follows: 
The weather is sunny. John only brings his umbrella when it rains, so he will not bring it today. 
Inductive reasoning is the process of deriving plausible conclusions that go beyond the information in the 
premises (Johnson-Laird, 2009). Inductive reasoning is self-referencing in a manner that is similar to 
deductive reasoning in that it infers concepts only from available data within a model or frame of reference 
(Magnani, 1995; Reichertz, 2010; Schurz, 2007). Unlike deduction, induction does not produce guaranteed 
true conclusions as deduction does. Instead, inductive reasoning infers conclusions that go beyond the 
available data. An example of inductive reasoning is as follows: 
Upon having drawn five white marbles from the bag, Peter concludes that all the remaining marbles in the 
bag must be white. 
Abductive reasoning is a process of conjecture that yields the best (and simplest) explanation to a course of 
events. An abduction is the preliminary estimate that introduces plausible hypotheses and informs where 
to first enquire by choosing the best candidate among a multitude of possible explanations (Magnani, 1995; 
Schurz, 2007). Therefore, abduction is reductive; however, it does not, unlike induction, require one to 
draw conclusions from available data. Abductive reasoning differs from deductive and inductive reasoning 
in that abduction involves guessing and (sometimes unfounded) assumptions as the basis for reasoning. An 
example of abductive reasoning is as follows:  
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Lisa’s fingerprints were on the gun that shot Michael. Lisa is suspected of firing the gun. 
In design activity, abductive reasoning involves the conception of new rules or types of relationships to 
explain an intended outcome (Roozenburg, 1993). This innovative potential of abductive reasoning makes it 
a creative feat, by definition, and thus also necessary in the generation of anything original (Dorst, 2011; 
Reichertz, 2010). In contrast, neither deductive nor inductive reasoning can propose entirely new ideas or 
concepts because they depend on available data to draw conclusions (Peirce, 1980). 
The logic of reasoning in design is proposed to be an abductive activity moving from function to form 
(Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993). In cases of reasoning leading to innovation or new ideas, such abductions 
are termed as innoduction (Roozenburg, 1995) or abduction-2 (Dorst, 2011) signifying a type of reasoning 
that moves from an aspired value or function towards a form, but without knowing either the working 
principle or form beforehand. A more recent proposal elaborates this process as a two-step abductive 
process that invents a form (design object), a mode of use and a mode of action to fulfil the desired function 
(Kroll & Koskela, 2015). One way to exemplify reasoning in design used originally by Roozenburg (1993) and 
later elaborated by Kroll & Koskela (2014) is the imagined first development of a kettle to boil water using a 
stove. The first abduction pertains to the desired outcome of making water boil (function), which 
necessitates placing water on the burner for heating, concluding one, among many possible, modes of 
action. The second abduction concludes that a device to hold the water in place (form) is one, among many 
possible, viable solutions on the premise of the just-concluded modes of action. Thus, abduction is also 
termed as the inference to the best explanation because it involves a particularly promising conjecture 
(Roozenburg, 1993; Schurz, 2007).  
In the above definitions and examples, reasoning processes are conceptual and assume a logically sound 
reasoning pattern whereby abductive reasoning is the only reasoning type with the potential to create 
something new (Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993).  
1.2 PREMISES FOR REASONING 
Per the definition, the reasoning types of deduction, induction and abduction define ways of making 
inferences from premises that reflect the knowledge and beliefs held by the person engaged in reasoning 
(Dorst, 2011). Such knowledge and beliefs form – and stem from – mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
Mental models are constructs that organise knowledge pertaining to specific contexts (Klimoski & 
Mohammed, 1994) and are thus relevant in the understanding of human behaviour and reasoning in design 
activity (Badke-Schaub et al, 2007). Mental models are not fixed, and they change according to the new 
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experiences and knowledge created in relevant situations (Johnson-Laird, 2009). Thus, as logical reasoning 
is based on mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), inferences drawn from reasoning are not fixed and vary 
among individuals. Hence, empirically studying reasoning implies that the reasoning observed reflects, and 
depends on, the individual mental models held. 
Rittel (1987) defines reasoning in design as a process of argumentation. In design activity, this results in 
issues and competing positions that are simultaneously interconnected and ‘open’ as a consequence of 
different mental models. When engaged in a verbal discourse, these divergent perspectives can appear as 
speculation, argumentation, trade-offs or negotiation (Bucciarelli, 2002; Rittel, 1987). Furthermore, when 
reasoning in a context of dialogue with other people, a person uses mental models, implicitly or explicitly, 
to create a frame of understanding, which in turn allows for the generation and description of solutions – 
design activity. As design is a social process (Bucciarelli, 2002) involving the differing perspectives of those 
involved, ideas are not necessarily understood or accepted by the audience, resulting in an argumentative 
interaction among the participants (Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002). Thus, the ‘logic’ of verbal reasoning takes 
the form of conclusions based on premises that both draw on existing understandings (facts) and on values 
(Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002) and thus diverge from the logical definitions of reasoning that assume a 
universal truth for deductive reasoning and a strict adherence to only what is observed for inductive 
reasoning (Peirce, 1980). 
Taking the definition of reasoning in design as a process of argumentation at face value (Rittel, 1987), the 
field of argumentation theory and rhetoric offers insights to explain reasoning in groups of people. 
Argumentation theory defines argumentation as an integral part of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
Thus, analysing conversation in groups of people engaged in design holds the potential to facilitate an 
understanding of and explain verbal reasoning as the deployment of linguistic processes to satisfy the 
demands of reasoning (Polk & Newell, 1995). Such attempts at verbal reasoning derive their effectiveness 
from their similarity to formal types of reasoning (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1973). A consonant 
explanation from the field of cognitive science is that the beliefs and knowledge held in the mental models 
used to reason about specific tasks or events are held in working memory and may therefore be articulated 
(Christensen & Schunn, 2009). 
Verbal reasoning is therefore not identical to the deductive, inductive or abductive reasoning types in the 
formal logical sense; however, a verbal realisation bears similarities to logical reasoning types in their 
verbal deployment. Therefore, perceiving group dialogues as a process of argumentation is representative 
of the underlying reasoning with the important implications that a) the reasoning reflects the deployment 
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of a mental model that might be different from the ones held by those addressed in verbal reasoning 
(Badke-Schaub et al, 2007; Johnson-Laird, 1983) and that b) the verbal enactment of such reasoning is 
influenced by values and beliefs and in turn acts to propose a certain perspective (Dong, 2007; Stumpf & 
McDonnell, 2002). 
1.3 MODELS OF DESIGN ACTIVITY 
Various models and frameworks emphasise design as a process involving different types of activity and as a 
process of inquiry. The following section reviews such models of design activity focusing on descriptions or 
prescriptions of the micro-level steps and thinking involved in design activity, i.e., the different reasoning 
implied by the models. 
Drawing on the works of Peirce and thus drawing on the formal reasoning types directly, March (1976) 
proposes the production-deduction-induction (PDI) model. The PDI model proposes a rational design 
process of cyclic iterative procedures characterised by three different types of reasoning, proposing a 
productive-deductive-inductive cycle as a necessary element of reasoning in design. First, productive 
reasoning composes something novel. It suggests that something may be. Second, deductive reasoning 
decomposes and predicts the performance characteristics of a design that emerge from analysis of the 
composition. It proves that something must be. Third, inductive reasoning supposes from the accumulation 
of knowledge and the establishment of values evolving from the prior productive and deductive reasoning. 
It tests whether something actually is. Empirically testing the PDI model, a study by Lloyd & Scott (1994) 
analysed the think-aloud protocols of engineering designers for generative, deductive and evaluative 
reasoning and concluded that reasoning types interact and that generative-deductive-inductive sequences 
occur during design activity; however, they also found other sequences of reasoning. More recently, the 
PDI model has been criticised for proposing design to explicitly concern generalisation through inductive 
reasoning (Koskela, Paavola, & Kroll, 2018) and to draw overtly from the abductive, deductive, inductive 
reasoning cycles used in scientific discovery (Magnani, 2004). Hence, there is reason to question the validity 
of inductive reasoning to have a specific role in design reasoning. 
In a study, Galle (1996a) empirically analysed design reasoning through the use of replication protocol 
analysis by asking an expert architect to replicate the interpreted reasoning underlying other people’s 
work. Using such analysis, he found patterns of inference corresponding to abductive and deductive 
reasoning and argues that deductive reasoning can be productive and introduce new elements to a design. 
He further observed that design reasoning is occasionally opportunistic and based on beliefs and therefore 
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does not necessarily reach a strict, formal, logical conclusion as per the premises acting as the basis for 
reasoning. 
In the theory of reflective practice, Schön (1983) proposes a perspective on design activity. Acknowledging 
that design contains logical design patterns consisting of “if… then” propositions that occur in cumulative 
sequences from prior decisions, Schön emphasises the different contextual norms drawn by the domains of 
different stakeholders involved in design. The process of design, in Schön’s perspective, is a practice 
involving naming, framing, moving and reflecting in cycles converging towards problem understanding and 
moving towards a solution (Schön, 1991). First, naming focuses explicitly on a part of the design task. 
Second, framing guides subsequent activity by providing a way for individuals and teams alike to ‘see’ and 
shape the design problem. Third, moving generates solutions to solve the problem set by the frame. 
Fourth, reflecting evaluates moves relating to their desirability. A study by Valkenburg & Dorst (1998) using 
protocol analysis found that a student design team managing both framing and moving activity in 
integration led to good team performance, thus indicating a dynamic between activities that diverge and 
allowing new ways to ‘see’ in combination with the generation of (tentative) solutions to solve, or test, a 
process similar to mental simulation (Christensen & Schunn, 2009). 
Using the concept of generative sensing, Dong et al. (2016) describes design reasoning as a pattern of 
deductive and abductive reasoning that provides different “ways through the problem” (ibid.: p 3) in the 
case of design concept evaluation. Aside from finding abductive reasoning present in evaluation, they also 
argue for abductive reasoning as being directed towards both convergent and divergent thinking, i.e., 
proposing both new frames of understanding as ways of reaching conclusions. Dong et al. (2015) also 
analysed the verbal protocols of reasoning processes among people discussing and evaluating design ideas 
and concepts in terms of the deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning types, showing that reasoning 
can be reliably identified from protocols including recorded dialogue in groups of people. They found that 
the type of reasoning dominant when evaluating ideas influenced the evaluation of the ideas. Abductive 
reasoning for evaluating tended to result in more ideas being accepted, while the opposite was true for 
deductive reasoning used for evaluation. Consequently, they argue for further debating and analysing 
empirical reasoning, as opposed to theoretical observations on reasoning in design from a logical 
perspective. 
An alternative model of design is proposed by Hatchuel and Weil (2008). Concept-knowledge (C-K) 
emphasises the interplay between what is conjectured or unknown and what is known or in existence, and 
it describe the operators between concept and knowledge. One such operator is between knowledge and 
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thus consist of logical reasoning (akin to that proposed by Peirce). Other operators allow for the making of 
concepts and assessing them through available (accepted) knowledge or, conversely, using knowledge to 
inform and generate new concepts. Hence, C-K theory suggests a dynamic between ways of thinking that 
are tentative and that which is accepted, factual or otherwise taken for granted. 
1.4 PATTERNS OF REASONING IN DESIGN 
The reviewed models and studies of design activity all describe the activity as going through stages that 
enter into iterations or re-formulations towards a solution. In common for all models is the notion of 
sequences of activity that iterate between activities that propose a new perspective on a design task, 
regardless of whether they are termed compositions, frames, or ways to perceive on the one hand, and 
activities that seek to describe, predict or move towards design solutions on the other hand. While some of 
the reviewed models also explicitly state the existence of an activity concerning the evaluation and 
reflection of the previous, this activity seems more doubtful. Thus, the approaches have in common that 
they describe design activity as being iterative, involving cycles of reasoning towards solutions and being a 
process of learning about the problem through the generation of solutions, resulting in the co-evolution of 
problem and solution (Dorst & Cross, 2001).  
Despite the relative agreement in the models that design activity iterates between hypothesis generation 
and exploration, there are results showing that the underlying reasoning types in some cases function in 
discordance with their strictly formal definitions. An example of this is the arguments by Galle (1996a) that 
deductive reasoning does in some cases produce new solutions, or that abductive reasoning is also 
prevalent in the evaluation of design concepts (Dong et al, 2016). Pertaining to design activity, Rittel (1987) 
argues that there is no clear separation between problem definition, synthesis and evaluation in real-world 
design activity and that “only at the micro-level can we identify patterns of reasoning corresponding to [the 
design process]” (Rittel, 1987: p 3).  
1.5 ANALYSING MICRO-LEVEL REASONING IN DESIGN 
As shown in the above review of the existing research on reasoning in design, little or no research has been 
done on the reasoning patterns present at the micro-level of design activity comprising the inference made 
at the level of individual arguments between groups of designers. Research is therefore desired to identify 
and understand reasoning patterns within arguments – what this study defines as micro-level design 
activity (Dong et al, 2015; Rittel, 1987). The decision to analyse micro-level reasoning implies parting with 
the thus-far established perception of reasoning as containing premises, rules and conclusions. The present 
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approach allows for analysing entire reasoning patterns whereas the previous studies determine a single 
type of reasoning. Arguably, this allows for a more fine-grained understanding of how design activity takes 
place. 
Synthesising the above review, the paper proposes to empirically test whether the characteristics of design 
activity show a pattern if interpreted as a reasoning process. Departing from the above-described formal 
definitions of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning as distinct types and combining that with the 
reviewed models of design activity, a process of reasoning in design would involve 1) abductive reasoning 
that leads to a problem setting by framing and suggesting functions, followed by 2) deductive reasoning 
that concretises the solution and predicts its effects on the problem set. Finally, a more debated phase 
might involve inductive reasoning that evaluates design activity. The two-stage process is similar to a 
definition from the field of cognitive science that describes a generic problem-solving cycle as a multi-stage 
process involving the “…use [of] some constraints to generate a putative solution, and other constraints, 
such as the goal of the problem, to criticise and amend the results" (Johnson-Laird, 2006: p 353).  
Based on results from above reviewed studies of reasoning in design, design activity, and consequently 
design reasoning, is not expected to follow the two-stage process in a strict and homogeneous way. 
Nonetheless, the commonalities explained above across models of design activity invites investigation into 
the degree to which such a pattern of abductive-deductive reasoning does indeed exist and what the role 
of inductive reasoning might be. 
1.6 IDEA GENERATION AS AN INSTANCE OF DESIGN ACTIVITY 
A specific stage of the design process is the generation of design ideas whereby new ideas are put forward 
and explored. Dictionaries commonly define ideas as concerning 1) an imagined outcome, 2) a course of 
action and 3) the basis on which something is believed to be valid (Merriam-Webster; Oxford). Hence, 
perceiving ideas as a process of inference is consonant with the above descriptions of the reasoning 
processes underpinning design activity because the notion of an idea contains a setting and/or proposition 
for an imagined outcome as well as a description towards an actual solution. The early stage of idea 
generation provides a way to investigate the proposed abductive-deductive patterns within short time 
intervals, allowing for a higher number of episodes suitable for analysing patterns in reasoning. 
Furthermore, idea generation designates a key part of the design process (Cross, 2001) that regards the 
formulation of, and trade-offs between, issues of key design features (Ahmed et al, 2003; Bucciarelli, 2002). 
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Hence, design idea generation is deemed a suitable unit of analysis to investigate reasoning behaviour 
notwithstanding the potential representativity to design activity in general. 
Finally, to arrive at a practical approach to analysing the three-stage reasoning process in a context of idea 
generation, a simplified separation of ideas into three equal parts is done. This will allow for the analysis of 
specific concentrations of reasoning types at different stages of design activity. The specific division into 
three parts is grounded in the prevalence of models of design activity that concern two or more stages of 
design. While the greatest agreement among these is that of abductive-deductive patterns, as discussed 
above, there is some disagreement as to the role of evaluation in design activity. Hence, a three-part 
division of ideas will allow for a greater resolution for analysing reasoning occurrences as ideas develop and 
also leave room for investigating whether any unexpected patterns of reasoning occur during the end of 
ideas. 
2 AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The study aims to understand empirical design reasoning in a context of group design activity in the context 
of idea generation. The aim is pursued in two ways: first, by testing a set of hypotheses regarding a 
proposed abductive-deductive pattern with regard to the verbal deployment of reasoning among groups of 
designers. Second, the study aims to show and discuss how reasoning occurs at the micro-level of design 
activity. This is done through the use of examples to illustrate the reasoning patterns identified in group 
idea generation. 
Pertaining to the first aim, a set of two hypotheses predict a distribution of reasoning in idea generation 
resulting from the analysis of reasoning in design and models of design activity. 
H1: Abductive (compared to deductive) reasoning is relatively concentrated in the first part of the verbal 
realisation of an idea 
H2: Deductive (compared to abductive) reasoning is relatively concentrated in the middle part of the verbal 
realisation of an idea 
Finally, a more tentative and exploratory question is posed as to the role of inductive reasoning. While not 
expected to be prominent in idea generation as it is evaluative (de Bono, 1995), there is an expectation that 
any inductive reasoning present will be more pronounced in the last parts of generated ideas. 
 
 
 
  10 
 
 
The hypotheses concern an analysis of the proportional distribution of reasoning within design ideas as a 
unit of analysis, divided in three parts. A first part of abductive reasoning that serves to state an intention 
or desired result by conjecturing that a specific aspect of the design task is relevant. Next, there is a middle 
part of deductive reasoning, indicating the concretisation of solutions framed by the initial hypothesis. 
Finally, the last part of reasoning is more uncertain, in some cases described as being evaluative through 
induction (March, 1976) Because this model is contested (Koskela et al., 2018), we refrain from making 
definitive hypotheses about what type of reasoning is more prevalent in the last parts of ideas; however, 
we venture an exploratory question as to the role of inductive reasoning. Together, the hypotheses predict 
that idea generation design reasoning follows an abductive-deductive pattern through the ideas generated. 
As argued above, ideas represent an instantiation of design activity, thus allowing the use of individual idea 
episodes as a basis for determining reasoning patterns that go through the proposed two-stage process 
within a limited timeframe. Rittel (1987) proposes that the reasoning patterns in design activity are 
disorderly. Thus, the hypotheses do not predict a strict adherence to an abductive-deductive pattern but 
rather predict that each reasoning type is concentrated at specific parts of ideas. 
Pertaining to the second aim of the study, a qualitative analysis of the reasoning patterns found in the data 
is conducted to flesh out the implications of the quantitative analysis obtained by testing the hypotheses.  
3 METHOD 
The study collected data from five teams of three members working on idea generation for the same design 
task. Protocol coding of transcribed recordings was used as the basis for analysing the data. 
3.1 DATA COLLECTION 
An experiment was designed for teams of participants from industry engaged in idea generation to perform 
a specific design task. The participants volunteered to take part in the experiment as part of an innovation 
workshop. The participants were from different companies and industry sectors. Nine participants were 
female, and six were male. Table 1 summarises the details pertaining to the participants. 
A study by Ahmed et al. (2003) found differences in reasoning activities between novice and experienced 
designers, warranting data collection focusing on the design activity of experienced professionals since this 
is more representative of actual design activity and behaviour than e.g., that of novices or students. 
Regarding the number of participants in the analysis, the argument is twofold. First, obtaining industry 
professionals is a barrier in terms of obtaining a high number of participants; however, for the reasons 
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outlined above, we preferred to use students; and second, the data segmentation and qualitative coding 
method approaches 6 000 segments, which would be unmanageable and highly time consuming if it were 
much larger. 
Participant information Previous working experience 
Participant Group 
 
Gender Industry sector 
Years of 
experience 
Problem 
solving 
Technical 
design 
Creative 
methods 
1 1 M Energy 27 X X X 
2 1 F Higher education 7 X  X 
3 1 F Telecommunication 41 X  X 
4 2 M Logistics 20 X X X 
5 2 F Finance 19 X  X 
6 2 F Publishing 25 X  X 
7 3 F Graphical design 1 X X X 
8 3 M Publishing 35 X  X 
9 3 M Logistics 40 X  X 
10 4 F Higher education 10   X 
11 4 F Public administration 17 X X X 
12 4 M Organisation 15 X  X 
13 5 M Healthcare 23 X  X 
14 5 F Pharma 20 X  X 
15 5 F Insurance 14 X  X 
 
Average = 20.9 
[SD = 11.5] 93% 27% 100% 
 Table 1: Background details of participants. 
Prior to the idea generation session, an introduction to the design task was provided by the main author. 
Next, teams were generated at random to form five teams of three participants each. 
To make the design task understandable for participants of varying backgrounds, it focused on the 
generation of ideas for radically reducing water consumption at a local hotel. To match the backgrounds of 
the participants, the design task emphasised the generation of ideas concerning not only technical 
solutions but also organisational or behavioural ideas, or combinations thereof. The task was formulated by 
an industry company with a commercial interest in the subject matter of the task before the experiment to 
ensure the relevance to real life industrial design practice. No participants of the study were from this 
company. 
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The team began with a 10-minute period to become familiar with the design task and the idea generation 
process. The period involved discussions between the facilitators and the participants on practical details as 
well as informal talk and socialisation in the teams. After this, the teams generated ideas, spending 20 
minutes using the three creative methods: brainstorming, random Images and bio-cards. The idea 
generation methods were intended to create variation over the course of the idea generation sessions. The 
participants were provided with paper for taking notes or sketching. Table 2 presents the creative methods 
used for idea generation. 
Method Idea generation with no 
instructions 
Random images Bio-cards 
Description Teams were instructed to 
brainstorm together to 
generate ideas, following the 
principles of generating 
many ideas and withholding 
criticism (Osborn, 1953). 
Each team was given six 
random images from a 
catalogue of 100 random 
images drawn from the past 
research on idea generation 
in design (Christensen, 
2010). Images relating to 
water or nature were not 
used in the pool from which 
the images were drawn to 
avoid overlap with bio-
cards. 
Each team was given six 
bio-cards created using the 
Ask Nature Biomimicry 
Taxonomy (Ask Nature). 
Six functions were picked at 
random from taxonomy 
functions relating to water, 
including functions relating 
to filtering, transporting, 
collecting and optimising 
water (consumption).  
Table 2: Creative methods used by teams to generate ideas. 
The five teams underwent the idea generation in parallel, in separate rooms. A graduate student of design 
engineering facilitated each team, instructing the participants to a) allow individual idea generation but 
ensure that ideas are presented and discussed as a group; b) build on the ideas generated by others, if 
relevant; and c) ensure timekeeping. The facilitators were blind to the hypotheses and aims of the study, 
and they followed a printed protocol to ensure that the teams adhered to the time schedule and activities. 
In some instances, the facilitator contributed to the discussion to ensure that the teams did not get stuck in 
generating ideas. Since the facilitators were blind to the purpose of the study, their involvement did not 
interfere with the natural dialogue occurring in the teams.  
For all teams, brainstorming was the first method, after which the ordering of the random images and bio-
cards methods were presented in random order to avoid any ordering effects caused by ideas generated 
using previous methods that included providing the participants with inspirational material. The facilitators 
began each method with a short introduction, after which the participants began generating ideas. 
 
 
 
  13 
 
 
Video and audio recordings were used to collect the data of the idea generation process, resulting in a total 
of 5 hours and 36 minutes of video of design interaction from the five teams (varying from 62 to 73 minutes 
per team).  
3.2 ANALYSIS METHOD 
The data were analysed using protocol analyses of concurrent verbalisation. Protocol analysis of design 
activity is appropriate to understand underlying cognitive processes such as reasoning, with minimal 
interruption of the recorded process (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Consequently, verbal protocol analyses of 
practitioners from industry is relevant and expected to be highly representative of design cognition found 
in practice (Ahmed et al, 2003; Chi, 1997; Christensen & Ball, 2014). In this case, as the observations were 
in teams, no forced or primed instructions for the participants to think-aloud were given, resulting in a 
minimum of interference with thought processes. 
The idea generation sessions were transcribed. To analyse these protocols of verbal data in depth, 
qualitative coding was considered to be a viable method (Chi, 1997). To prepare for the coding of reasoning 
at a micro-level, segmentation was completed according to word phrases to allow the individual coding of 
utterances of the shortest possible meaningful length (Goldschmidt, 1991).  
Next, a two-step coding scheme was developed to analyse the segmented protocols. 
The first step of analysing the protocols involved the identification of the ideas uttered by the teams. Table 
3 presents the code names and definitions.  
Code name Definition 
idea Idea coded segments are the un-interrupted sequence of utterances put forward by a 
participant proposing an idea. 
idea aspect Idea aspect coded segments are the utterances following idea codes but relating to the 
previous idea. Aspects of an idea can be multiple and stated by all participants. Aspects 
can also appear after breaks in the sequence of idea-related utterances. 
Table 3: Code names and definitions for ideas used in the first step of coding scheme. 
As ideas involve solutions and sub-solutions (idea aspects) (Badke-Schaub et al, 2007), it is necessary to 
perceive ideas as being put forward in a distributed manner, and at different levels of abstraction (Voss, 
2006). More than one participant can contribute to the generation of ideas. Consequently, the protocols do 
not distinguish complete uninterrupted utterance sequences but groups of utterances relating to an idea 
put forward and related aspects of that idea. This group of segments is referred to as an idea episode (Chi, 
1997). To test the hypotheses, each idea episode was separated into three parts. The first part is the first 
part of the idea episode, counted by reasoning occurrences, roun
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applied for the last part but using the last part of reasoning occurrences in an idea episode, rounded down. 
The remaining reasoning occurrences are assigned to the middle part. 
Table 4 presents the definitions of the reasoning types used to code for reasoning, derived from the 
literature review on the three reasoning types. The definitions were chosen to reflect the central 
characteristics of the three reasoning types, at their core describing the different ways of reaching a 
conclusion from premises. The interpretation of the coding definitions instructed the coder to code by 
establishing the ‘form’ of each utterance. This was necessary to code for the actual way in which each 
reasoning utterance was presented to the team to avoid coding the implicit meanings behind an utterance 
instead, which would not be in keeping with the principles of coding verbal reasoning as argued in section 
1.2: 
a. the reasoning utterance reflects the deployment of a mental model that might be different from 
the ones held by those addressed (Badke-Schaub et al., 2007; Johnson-Laird, 1983) 
b. the verbal enactment of reasoning is influenced by values and beliefs and in turn acts to propose a 
certain perspective (Dong, 2007; Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002) 
The segment length used here to code for reasoning deviates from other reviewed empirical studies of 
reasoning(e.g., Dong et al., 2016; Galle, 1996a; Lloyd & Scott, 1994) as well as reviewed conceptual models 
(e.g., Dorst, 2011; Roozenburg, 1993) in that the segments (word phrases) do not in themselves contain 
explicit premises, rules and conclusions. Rather, the coding of the reasoning for such short segments is a 
consequence of the aim to analyse the reasoning at a micro-level (Rittel, 1987) in which each reasoning 
segment is dependent on the reasoning pattern (episode) into which it enters. This implies that each micro-
level reasoning occurrence can be distinguished and analysed to more accurately describe reasoning 
patterns. 
Reasoning code Coding definitions 
Abduction • A hypothesis to account for what is desired or intended (Roozenburg, 1993) 
• Creating ideas (to a problem) from imagination (Johnson-Laird, 2009) 
• A belief held without proof or certain knowledge (Schurz, 2007) 
• Preliminary guess to introduce hypotheses (Fann, 1970) 
Deduction • Definitive and certain conclusion (Schurz, 2007) 
• Explicating hypothesis by suggesting consequences (Fann, 1970) 
• Prediction of result in a given frame (Fann, 1970) 
• Proves something must be (March, 1976) 
• Explores consequences of an abduction (Fann, 1970) 
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Induction • Tests a hypothesis with available data (Schurz, 2007) 
• Generalises from specific instance or idea (Reichertz, 2010) 
• Evaluates if something is operative (Fann, 1970) 
• Inferring from observed to unobserved (Schurz, 2007) 
• Inferring about future courses of events (Johnson-Laird, 2009) 
Table 4: Code names and definitions for reasoning types used in the second step of coding scheme 
(reference removed for blind review). 
The coding of reasoning types was restricted to the idea episodes coded in the first step of the coding 
process because the focus is on the inferences made during the generation of ideas. 
Cohen’s Kappa was calculated for inter-coder reliability after each of the coding steps (Cohen, 1968). The 
first and third author coded 460 segments for idea and idea aspect, reaching a Kappa of 0.71, and 353 
segments for reasoning, reaching a Kappa of 0.61. Both scores are considered ‘high’ (Fleiss, 1981) or 
‘substantial’ (Landis & Koch, 1977) and justify the reliability of the coding scheme. The Kappa does not 
reveal where the specific disagreements come from; however, a qualitative analysis shows that for idea and 
idea aspect coding, no particular combination of disagreement stands out. For reasoning coding, the 
primary source of disagreement came from the deduction code, where the second coder tended to code 
fewer occurrences of the code, while the first coder would code more instances of the code. Since the 
disagreements occurred in common appearances of multiple deduction codes in a series of uninterrupted 
segments, the source of error was adapted to refine the code definition for coding the remaining protocols. 
Disagreements among the coders were discussed, and a common decision was made as to which code to 
apply. 
4 RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the analysis. First, the results of the coding provide an overview of the 
protocol data and the results of the hypotheses. Second, two examples from the protocols illustrate the 
coding scheme and describe the reasoning patterns found at an individual idea level.  
4.1 SUMMARY OF PROTOCOL CODING RESULTS 
The protocols counted 5 792 segments of which 2 047 (35%) were idea episodes, i.e., utterances relating to 
the generation of an idea. Other segments were not determined to concern the generation of ideas in 
addition to other utterances such as reflection on the design task and social conversation. Idea episodes 
contained 1 698 (83%) reasoning segments, distributed in 218 ideas in total. Table 5 summarises the 
results. 
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  Abductive Deductive Inductive 
Coded reasoning Count 349 1 226 123 
Proportion 21% 72% 7% 
Table 5: Summary of coding results.  
As observed from the above, deductive reasoning is the most frequent, accounting for 72% of all reasoning, 
while abductive reasoning is the second most frequent type of reasoning accounting for 21%. 
4.2 REASONING PATTERNS IN IDEA EPISODES 
The hypotheses predict the following development of reasoning patterns in idea episodes.  
• H1 predicts a concentration of abductive reasoning in the beginning parts of ideas generated, 
serving to state an intention or desired result by conjecturing that a specific aspect of the design 
task is relevant. 
• H2 predicts that deductive reasoning is concentrated in the middle parts of ideas generated, 
indicating the concretisation of solutions framed by the initial hypothesis.  
Figure 1 illustrates the progression of reasoning distribution across the three parts of ideas.  
Figure 1: Proportional distribution of reasoning by idea parts with trend lines to emphasise direction 
To test the hypotheses, a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are completed. A non-parametric test is 
applied since the proportional distributions of reasoning in the three idea episode parts are not generally 
distributed; however, it does show a symmetrical shape in differences among the groups, i.e., the 
difference of reasoning proportions among each reasoning type across the first, middle and last parts of 
ideas. Table 6 presents the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests necessary to test hypotheses. 
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Reasoning type Tested groups Z N Significance 
Abductive  First part, middle part -5.698 203 p < .001 
First part, last part -6.716 203 p < .001 
Deductive  Middle part, first part -4.984 203 p < .001 
Middle part, last part 1.090 203 p = .276 
Inductive  Last part, first part -1.841 203 p = .066 
Last part, middle part -1.397 203 p = .162 
Table 6: Results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of hypotheses. 
Pertaining to the hypotheses, it was found that: 
• Abductive reasoning accounts for 37% of total reasoning in the first part of ideas and significantly 
decreases to 20% in the middle part (Z = -5.698, p < .001) and 12% in last part (Z = -6.716, p < .001), 
supporting H1. 
• Deductive reasoning accounts for 72% of total reasoning in the middle part, thus significantly 
decreasing to 5% in middle part (Z = -4.984, p < .001), while actually increasing from the middle 
(72%) to the last part (76%) (Z = 1.199, p = .276). This result only supports H2 from the middle to 
the first parts, while a direction opposite to what was expected is observed from the middle to the 
last parts.  
As for the exploratory question of the role of inductive reasoning, the results showed that inductive 
reasoning accounts for 12% of total reasoning in the last part of ideas, 9% in the middle part and 8% in the 
first part.  
Table 6 summarises the test results. Please note that of the 218 total ideas, 203 were of a length that 
allowed analysing reasoning proportions across all three parts. Aside from the tested hypotheses, the 
results show that all types of reasoning occur in all parts of ideas and that deductive reasoning is the 
dominant type across all parts of ideas, accounting for 55%, 72% and 76% in first, middle and last parts, 
respectively. Since	the	facilitators	took	part	to	a	limited	degree	in	the	idea	generation	(287	segments	coded	for	reasoning,	equivalent	to	5%	of	all	reasoning),	the	proportional	distributions	and	statistical	tests	were	re-calculated	to	determine	any	biases	in	reasoning	patterns	caused	by	the	facilitators	(despite	their	being	blind	to	the	study’s	aims	and	hypotheses).	The	procedure	excluded	all	complete	idea	episodes	in	which	a	facilitator	uttered	any	reasoning	(i.e.,	segments	by	facilitators	coded	for	any	of	the	reasoning	types),	resulting	in	a	reduction	of	79	idea	episodes.	Pertaining	to	proportional	distributions	using	the	reduced	data,	the	results	were	very	similar,	showing	differences	up	to	1,5%-points.	A	re-run	of	the	Wilcoxon	Signed	Rank	test	confirmed	this	by	showing	the	same	significant	and	non-significant	results	
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as	reported	in	Table	6.	As	the	analysis	shows,	the	participation	of	facilitators	seems	not	to	have	interfered	with	the	results.	
To further assess the reliability (R) of these results, we conducted a string of analyses aimed at (R1) to 
assess if the results from the episode split into thirds could be replicated with a mean episode split; (R2) to 
assess whether the results depend on temporal development within the sessions (e.g., if abductive 
reasoning happens mainly early in a session) by splitting the transcripts into early/late parts and re-running 
the analyses; (R3) to test the reliability of the results in each individual team; and (R4) to conduct the same 
conceptual analyses at a different grain size by looking into the temporal ordering of individual arguments 
within each episode (as opposed to between as in the main analysis). (R1) All the main results could be 
replicated with a mean episode split: Abductive reasoning was more prevalent in the first half (Z = -5.756, p 
< .001), deductive reasoning was more prevalent in the second half (Z = 4.147, p < .001), and inductive 
reasoning showed an increasing, albeit insignificant, trend (Z = 1.869, p = .062). (R2) Each team’s transcript 
was meansplit into early/late parts. The results indicated that every analysis comparison had the same 
directionality and approximate size in each split half as they did in the main analysis. Every analysis that was 
significant in the main result was also significant for each transcript part, and conversely every insignificant 
main analysis was also insignificant in each transcript part. (R3) All main results were re-run by the team to 
assess whether the results were driven by a subset of teams. Splitting by team reduces power, and 
therefore we mainly sought to interpret reliability based on the directionality of the results (as opposed to 
the significance levels). For abductive reasoning, all five teams replicated a declining effect from both the 
first to the middle part (p’s ranging .11 to .002) and from the first to the last parts (p’s ranging .078 to 
.0001). For deductive reasoning, both the increasing effect from the first to the middle part (p’s ranging .14 
to .0001), and the declining trend from the middle to the last part (p’s ranging .91 to .08) were replicable in 
all five teams. For inductive reasoning, the increasing trend from the first to the last part was found for all 
five teams, although always insignificant (p’s ranging .91 to .06). Less consistent was the inductive 
increasing trend from the middle to the last part as one team displayed opposite directionality, and one 
team showed no difference at all. (R4) To assess whether the main results could be replicated at a different 
grain size, we conducted a reasoning pattern analysis within the episode parts. Given the low count of 
inductive reasoning, we focused on the interaction between abductive reasoning and deductive reasoning. 
For each episode part, we counted the number of abductive-deductive (AD) versus deductive-abductive 
(DA) sequence patterns in terms of the order of which the reasoning types first occurred. The three parts of 
the episodes differed significantly in their reasoning patterns (χ2(2) = 17.43, p < .001). Follow-up two by two 
chi-square analyses showed that the first part had more AD than DA interactions compared to the middle 
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part (χ2(1) = 17.32, p < .001); however, they did not differ from the last part (χ2(1) = 2.44, ns). The middle 
part conversely differed from the last part, displaying relatively more DA than AD interactions (χ2(1) = 5.11, 
p < .03). These results were replicable with an episode mean split, again showing that the first half of the 
episodes displayed relatively more AD than DA interactions, compared to the second half (χ2(1) = 13.5.11, p 
< .03). Taken together, the main results appear to be extremely reliable and robust across episode splitting 
choices, transcript parts, teams, and choice of grainsize. The trending direction was almost uniformly the 
same in the reliability checks, although the lower N resulting from splitting the dataset did not always allow 
for significant results. The overall result is strong support for H1 and partial support for H2 and H3.  
To determine whether the groups were internally representative of reasoning in line with the hypotheses, 
all groups were analysed in relation a) to the overall proportions of reasoning types uttered and b) to 
whether each group was overly dominated by any single person and whether such persons displayed 
different reasoning patterns than expected. 
a) Of the 15 participants, 12 (80%) adhered to the same order in terms of the proportions of 
reasoning. That is, most deductive reasoning was followed by abductive and finally inductive 
reasoning. Deductive reasoning was the most prevalent for all of the remaining 3 participants. 
b) To address the internal distribution in the groups and whether the most active participant would 
skew the results, our analysis showed that the most active participant in each group contributed 
with respectively 49%, 48%, 41%, 49% and 57% of all group utterances - compared to 33% if all 
contributed equally, which is theoretical and not expected. Of these 5 participants, 4 adhered to 
the overall reasoning ordering (as reported above), while the last person had an equal proportion 
of abductive and inductive reasoning (both at 18%). 
Therefore, the reasoning proportion differences at the individual group levels seem not to interfere with 
the representativity of the overall results. 
 
4.3 EXAMPLES AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CODING OF REASONING 
Two examples are presented to illustrate the reasoning patterns identified from the protocol analyses. This 
is done by showing coded data supplied with a description of the specific sequences of reasoning occurring.  
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4.3.1 Example 1 
Table 7 presents the first example idea episode, including example descriptions of the code definitions used 
for the three reasoning types. The idea episode begins with an abduction proposing a principle to reuse 
water (Code definition: “A hypothesis to account for what is desired or intended”, refer to Table 4). 
Following this, a sequence of deductions occur that argue for why the specific principle is useful by 
specifying that it is possible to measure the effect of the idea (rows 2-8, Table 7) (Codes: Row 2: “Prediction 
of result in a given frame”, rows 3-7: “Explicating hypothesis by suggesting consequences”, row 8: 
“Definitive and certain conclusion”). Next, the facilitator [F] expands the idea by abduction (rows 9-10), 
building on the initial principle and initiating a new aspect of the idea. This time inductive reasoning follows 
the abductive reasoning by the remaining team members in the form of an evaluation of the use 
experience based on personal preference (rows 11-13) (Code: Rows 11-13: “Inferring about future courses 
of events”). A team member then proposes to re-contextualise the initial idea principle (rows 15-16) after 
which deductions determine the effect of the solution (row 17) and a statement (though not explained 
further) that postulates that an alternative purification method is possible (row 18). Finally, a deduction 
proposes the possibility of a new principle for reusing water (row 21).  
Row Speaker Segment Idea code Reasoning 
code 
1 M But maybe you could clean the water sufficiently from 
one to the other in a bathroom, 
idea abduction 
2 M so it’s not so much about returning it for wastewater 
treatment 
idea deduction 
3 M and then all the way back into the infrastructure, idea deduction 
4 M but you take it [the water] from the shower to the toilet, idea deduction 
5 M do a degree that it doesn’t create too much foam, idea deduction 
6 M because there are soap leftovers in, or whatever. idea deduction 
7 M If it just fills the toilet cistern… idea deduction 
8 M You could calculate it. idea deduction 
9 F Yes, it could be that you could make a closed circuit, idea aspect abduction 
10 F for every hotel room, right? idea aspect abduction 
11 M Yes, I like that. idea aspect induction 
12 R Oh yeah, I mean, then it’s your own filth you meet again, 
right? 
idea aspect induction 
13 R You would rather want that, than someone else’s. idea aspect induction 
14 F Yes idea aspect  
15 R Yeah, and you could make another closed circuit in the 
kitchens, 
idea aspect abduction 
16 R or the laundry room or the spa. idea aspect abduction 
17 M Then it shouldn’t transport so much water at the same 
time. 
idea aspect deduction 
18 R No, and it can be used, and you can make differentiated 
purification methods. 
idea aspect deduction 
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19 M Yes idea aspect  
20 R And possibly you could, if you make the…, I’m don’t 
know how. 
idea aspect  
21 R but then you could go from drinking water to showering 
water to kitchen water to cleaning water to toilet water 
idea aspect deduction 
22 R or whatever it could be so it sort of goes down through, 
right? 
idea aspect  
Table 7: Idea episode from protocols, translated to English for reporting. 
Three immediate observations stand out from the idea episode. First, the example shows that reasoning 
types occur in a pattern using all three types. Second, concerning the evolution of the idea, all team 
members partake in the elaboration of the idea through different aspects. Third, there is an interaction 
between the different occurrences of reasoning, both between and within same reasoning types.  
4.3.2 Example 2 
The second sample idea episode presented in Table 8 is an example of a purely deductive reasoning 
pattern. The episode begins by proposing an object (an exterior cover) without stating the desired outcome 
(Table 8, rows 1-2). Thereafter follows the desired outcome, implicitly stated by reference to a solution 
from the bio-card method (row 3). Then, a deductive sequence begins by reusing the structure and 
principle provided by the bio-card (rows 4-12). 
Row Speaker Segment Idea code Reasoning 
code 
1 V An exterior cover [surrounding the hotel], idea deduction 
2 V that can easily be done. idea deduction 
3 V But well, it absorbs the dew… idea deduction 
4 V It’s kind of like a membrane within a membrane, okay. idea deduction 
5 V So the membrane has these small channels, idea deduction 
6 V I mean, it leads the water in these tiny channels, idea deduction 
7 V just like the desert rhubarb. idea deduction 
8 V Then there are simply these rhubarb leaves forming a 
surface,  
idea deduction 
9 V then the tiny channels leads the water, idea deduction 
10 V and then they [water channels] can lead to some small, 
local water reservoirs, 
idea deduction 
11 V then it doesn’t have to lead it to a large reservoir in the 
ground, 
idea deduction 
12 V so it will be small local water reservoirs. idea deduction 
Table 8: Idea episode from protocols, translated to English for reporting. 
The example shows that reasoning patterns including only deductive reasoning are possible, in this case by 
analogising from a commonly understood object (the bio-card solution) towards a solution. Additionally, 
 
 
 
  22 
 
 
observed from the example is the absence of abductive reasoning and that only one person contributes to 
the idea. 
5 DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the results from the protocol analyses of reasoning patterns. The first part discusses 
the observed reasoning patterns by quantitative analysis and by referring to observations made from the 
patterns of reasoning found in specific idea episodes. The second part proposes three arguments from the 
basis of the study before discussing the implications of the results and proposes avenues of future 
research. 
5.1 HYPOTHESES AND GENERAL REASONING PATTERNS 
As the results of H1 show, there is a significant concentration of abductive reasoning in the first parts of 
ideas. Hence, the finding is consistent with the reviewed models of design activity that assume an 
abductive stage to initiate instances of inference-making in design activity (March, 1976; Schön, 1991). H2 
was only partially supported, finding deductive reasoning to increase as an idea progresses. The surprising 
prevalence of deductive reasoning persists throughout all idea parts (55–76%), while there is a significant 
concentration of abductive reasoning in the first parts. Hence, there is support for a theoretically proposed 
two-stage process involving abductive-deductive patterns, with only a few occurrences of inductive 
reasoning and all the while dominated by deductive reasoning across all parts of ideas. The results showed 
that the exploratory question pertaining to the presence of inductive reasoning can be negatively answered 
in the sense that inductive reasoning is the least prevalent type of reasoning. Rather, the last parts of ideas 
were the most concentrated parts of deductive reasoning. 
The tests to determine any differences between groups with or without fully experienced participants, as 
well as across various robustness checks, did not show any variations of the reasoning patterns. Hence, we 
observe that the reasoning patterns across many different factors, including the experience of the 
participants, temporal placement in idea generation sessions and more, are very robust and follow 
abductive-deductive patterns.  
The following section discusses the coded reasoning types and patterns using specific occurrences from the 
above presented examples.  
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Abduction-coded segments tend to occur in an uncertain form that at the same time proposes new frames 
or perspectives on functions to achieve to address the design task of saving water. The frames are not 
absolute and are observed to change as the idea progresses through re-framings that proposes new 
problem settings and aspects of ideas (Dorst & Cross, 2001; Schön, 1991). Concretely, example 1 shows 
how a first abduction is made (Table 7, row 1) in which a specific perspective that can possibly lead to the 
saving of water is introduced. Later, in the same example, abductions occur again to re-frame the initial 
perspective (rows 9-10) and again later introduced a sub-function to the previous (rows 15-16). 
Deduction-coded segments function to derive effects in response to the frames and appear as causal 
inference chains that lead to a conclusion. Often, these deductions draw on prior abductive reasoning as 
the premise. Further, they do not produce guaranteed objective ‘truths’. Rather, the deductions serve to 
explore and concretise the framing to amend and discern the validity of the abduction (Johnson-Laird, 
2009; Schön, 1991). The two examples each provide an explanation to the high proportion of deductive 
reasoning found in the protocols. Example 1 shows that deductive reasoning can occur as a series of 
deductions functioning to describe a solution (Table 7, rows 2-8) to a prior abduction (row 1), which is 
similar to the notion of mental simulation (only in a verbal form), found to be a strategy for resolving 
uncertainty in design activity (Christensen & Schunn, 2009). Example 2 shows a different deductive 
reasoning sequence (Table 8) that involves the analogical mapping of a solution provided by the bio-card 
design method to the design task at hand. This can be interpreted as an instance of direct analogical 
transfer (Ahmed & Christensen, 2009), a strategy found to be mostly used by novice designers (ibid.). 
However, the example also holds similarity to the notions of explanatory abductive reasoning (Roozenburg, 
1993) and abduction-1 type reasoning (Dorst, 2011) in that the reasoning pattern (here coded as deductive) 
follows an implicit abductive explanation that uses a known solution in a new context resulting in a causal 
explanation. The difference in ways of perceiving reasoning among the conceptual models of reasoning in 
design and the present verbal reasoning approach is discussed in greater detail in section 5.2. 
Induction-coded segments are shown in example 1 to occur in the form of the informal appraisal of an idea, 
in the example as personal preference (Table 7, row 11), or as a combination of evaluating the 
consequence of an idea and personal preference (rows 12-13). However, these are not instances of 
reasoning suitable for evaluation in relation to the discussed models of design and the formal role of 
inductive reasoning as the generalisation of the specific to the general (Peirce, 1980). Rather, the empirical 
analysis of inductive reasoning implies for inductive reasoning that the expression of personal preference 
(e.g., the utterance “Yes, I like that” found in row 11, Example 1) as part of the verbal form	of	some	underlying	acceptance	of	what	was	previously	proposed.	This	acceptance	is	based	on	some	previous	
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knowledge	or	experience	or	even	attitude	towards	a	specific	idea.	However,	since	the	reasoning	is	argumentative,	it	holds	a	possible	importance	to	the	dialogue	as	it	promotes	a	positive	attitude	and	agreement	that	might	spur	the	continuation	of	other	members	of	a	group.	
However, despite the negligible role of inductive reasoning, we contend that the observed abductive-
deductive patterns (discussed at length in section 5.2) in part makes up for the lack of evaluation through 
mental simulation (Christensen & Schunn, 2009). That is, for	deductive	reasoning,	the	utterances	put	forward	(often	in	sequences)	that	are	assumed	to	‘explicate’	and	explore	an	insight	from	the	premise	provided	one	possible	consequence	of	a	premise	(or	frame).	Thus,	this	one	possible	solution	is	not	without	importance	since	it	would	continue	to	be	one	of	the	more	relevant	solutions	to	a	proposed	frame	(assuming	that	uttered	ideas	are	better	than	ideas	never	put	forward	by	anyone	in	a	team).	In	turn,	such	solution	would	then	satisfy	the	need	for	exploring	a	given	frame,	thus	simulating	and	evaluating	an	idea.	Indeed,	similar	studies	of	design	reasoning	have	found	deductive	reasoning	to	be	evaluative	(Dong	et	al.,	2015)	in	relation	to	ideas.	
5.2 VERBAL REASONING IN IDEA GENERATION PROCESSES 
Drawing from the results of the tested hypotheses and the observations made from the ideas episodes, we 
make three primary arguments and discuss their implications and the need for future research. The first 
argument is that abductive-deductive sequences are a central component of micro-level design activity. 
The second is that empirically analysing reasoning necessitates perceiving reasoning patterns unlike those 
proposed in conceptual proposals of reasoning in design. The third is that verbal reasoning is indicative of 
the mental models held by individuals. In the following section, the implications of the study’s results for 
design practice are discussed. 
5.2.1 Abductive-deductive patterns dominate design idea generation 
First, pertaining to the reasoning pattern observed from the analysis of the proportional distribution, and 
tested by the hypotheses, we argue that an abductive-deductive pattern is appropriate for describing 
design activity in a context of idea generation, which is similar to what Roozenburg & Cross (1991) describe 
as analysis-synthesis cycles, or as the operation between concept and knowledge domains, as proposed by 
C-K theory (Hatchuel & Weil, 2008). As such, the reasoning types enter into patterns of inference that 
interact among abductive reasoning, found to be significantly concentrated at the beginning of ideas, and 
deductive reasoning is concentrated in the later parts of ideas but dominant throughout. Abductive 
reasoning proposes frames or perspectives for addressing the main design task, while deductive reasoning 
in turn explores how such a frame is viable to actually address the design task through simulation and thus 
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allows determining the validity of solutions (Johnson-Laird, 2009; Lloyd & Scott, 1994). This process then 
repeats or iterates, resulting in variations of the original frames, as exemplified by Table 7, rows 1-10. As 
such, we contend that the abductive-deductive cycles of reasoning without any explicit inductive reasoning 
to evaluate are not indicative of aimless activity. Rather, the cycles show similarity to what several models 
of design propose as a core tenet to design – the ability to quickly iterate among phases that are divergent 
and convergent, whether defined as mental simulation (Christensen & Schunn, 2009), generative sensing 
(Dong et al., 2016) or composition and decomposition (March, 1976). Aside from showing the presence of 
such patterns empirically, the present study contributes by showing how different reasoning types interact 
and are interdependent, as further discussed below.  
As the empirical data analysed in the present study focuses on idea generation activity, the future research 
should focus on analysing reasoning patterns in similar ways during other stages of design activity, e.g., 
concept development or detail design, to ascertain whether the same disorderly and opportunistic 
behaviour are present, and whether the abductive-deductive pattern is still a pronounced component of 
design activity. Work exists in this regard (see Ball, Evans, Dennis, & Ormerod, 1997; Visser, 1994) but 
draws conclusions based on analysing design activity in segments larger than treated here and as such does 
not allow for analysis of how inferences are made at a micro-level. Further, the research in this avenue is 
limited to instances of design activity whereby group design and argumentation among people naturally 
occurs to satisfy the presently applied methodological approach. 
5.2.2 Micro-level design activity contains interactions between reasoning types 
Second, as the results show, the applied coding scheme ascertains reasoning patterns at a micro-level of 
design activity and allows describing the processes involved in generating ideas in great detail. While a 
prominent abductive-deductive pattern exists, the presented examples of idea episodes show how 
reasoning types occur in chains of reasoning in different types and in disorderly patterns that do not 
necessarily adhere to formal reasoning types. These interactions among reasoning types further show that 
each individual instance of reasoning (at the coded micro-level) is interdependent to the other instances in 
which it is put forward – regardless of whether it is from the same person. Hence, a micro-level analysis of 
reasoning such as this then improves the understanding of design activity (Rittel, 1987) by showing the how 
different reasoning types interact by drawing conclusions using different patterns of inference, for 
example, the use of deductive reasoning to arrive at a solution under a given framing or the use of 
inductive reasoning to evaluate a framing with no presence of deductive reasoning. Such observations 
imply that design activity does not follow a strictly logical form but is also informal and comprises un-
structured and opportunistic activities (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). As also shown, these activities are shared, 
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showing a resemblance to the concept of shared cognition (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010) or team 
mental models (Dong, Kleinsmann, & Deken, 2013), which are indicators of the ability of groups to 
successfully work together. Further research is necessary in this direction to better understand how 
different types of reasoning behaviour, e.g., using different patterns, influences the solutions generated. 
One possible approach to this is the use of linkography (Goldschmidt, 2014) or similar means to identify 
influences among ideas and to determine the quality of generated ideas (Kudrowitz & Wallace, 2012). 
The analysis method applied in the research is based on the proposal that micro-level, argumentative, 
reasoning is key to understand design activity (Rittel, 1987). While other reviewed studies of design 
reasoning apply different methodologies, interpretations of reasoning and/or unit of analysis (e.g., Dong, 
Lovallo, & Mounarath, 2015; Galle, 2002; Lloyd & Scott, 1994), we do not presume our method to replace 
such methods. Rather, our approach allows a different perspective on reasoning in idea generation 
specifically.	The micro-level perspective on design reasoning offered here has the advantage of capturing 
reasoning as it is actually put forward to other members in a design team; however, it is limited in that it 
does not capture implicit, or taken for granted, common understandings in a team. The study thus offers an 
alternative interpretation of reasoning in design activity that is in contrast to existing conceptual models of 
design reasoning (Dorst, 2011; March, 1976; Roozenburg, 1993)as well as other empirical studies of 
reasoning (Galle, 1996a; Lloyd & Scott, 1994). 
5.2.3 Verbal reasoning is argumentative 
Third, acknowledging that verbal reasoning is influenced by values and intentions (Roozenburg, 1993; 
Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002) and that verbal reasoning is a process of argumentation (Rittel, 1987) that 
enacts design and thus influences design activity (Dong, 2007), we argue that the reasoning analysed here 
is inherently subjective and non-monotonous (McDonnell, 2012). This implies that while one participant in 
group design activity may use deductive reasoning because an inference fits a held mental model, the same 
inference may not be ‘true’ and thus is not suitable for deductive inference, in the group mental model, or 
with another participant. Therefore, the reasoning used during group design activity has a dual function of 
both making inferences towards the generation of new ideas and also being indicative of the mental 
models held by the members of that group, regardless of whether they are shared by other group 
members. Hence, reasoning is argumentative, underscoring the importance of the performative aspect of 
verbal reasoning when empirically analysing design activity. One approach to further investigate the 
argumentative aspect of design reasoning is the analysis of the mental models held among the members of 
design teams in correlation with identified reasoning patterns (Badke-Schaub et al., 2007). Such an analysis 
 
 
 
  27 
 
 
could provide insights into how coordinated or shared a group’s understanding of a design task is, which is 
shown to influence performance (ibid.). 
5.2.4 Implications for design practice 
For design practice, the results of the study provide a basis for understanding the cognitive processes 
involved in group idea generation and has at least two implications. First, the results can be used to 
develop AI tools to monitor and diagnose the dialogue among groups engaged in design activity and to 
make suggestions for changes to behaviour to intervene if, e.g., detected reasoning sequences do not 
adhere to abductive-deductive patterns. Second, the study has implications for the development of new, 
creative methods for idea generation as such methods should support the abovementioned abductive-
deductive patterns. In particular, as the study finds empirical evidence for the centrality of abductive-
deductive patterns in all part of ideas in the early stages of idea generation, the implications are that such 
creativity methods should support and allow deductive reasoning to be made in a dynamic and productive 
interaction with abductive reasoning rather than promoting division, meaning that abductive reasoning 
comes first, only allowing deductive reasoning at later stages (i.e., by only focusing on new idea perspective 
at first without allowing the utilisation of group resources to explore those ideas until later stages). Hence, 
the abductive-deductive dynamic can be seen as similar to hermeneutic circles or experiential learning 
allowing groups of designers to learn about how to generate solutions and re-interpret design tasks even at 
the micro-level of early stage design activity. 
Finally, the development of methods or tools to support reasoning in design practice must allow for the 
inherently argumentative characteristic of design. Hence, such methods should focus on making designers 
explicate their beliefs and test their assumptions. This could, for example, be done through the 
development of automated tools to monitor and diagnose design activity in relation to espoused reasoning 
patterns. Such tools could potentially support and intervene in design activity in situ. 
5.3 LIMITATIONS 
The present study of reasoning in design draws from empirical data from idea generation activity. Hence, 
the implications primarily concern such idea generation activity. However, as the hypotheses draw on 
models of design activity in general, the study allows for observations to be made on design activity in 
general. This is primarily done in the explanation and discussion of the examples in the study. To further 
qualify these observations, the paper also relates them to other behaviours of importance to design activity 
such as the use of mental simulations (B.T. Christensen & Schunn, 2009) or analysis-synthesis (Roozenburg, 
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1993). To address the generalisability of the research, further research is necessary at other stages of 
design activity. 
Further, the study’s design limits the making of observations or conducting analyses as to whether certain 
patterns or characteristics of verbal reasoning lead to greater value or effectiveness in idea generation 
activity than others. Future studies should analyse reasoning patterns to reliable outcome measures to idea 
‘quality’, which in turn would make it possible to develop methods or tools that promote such beneficial 
reasoning behaviour. 
There is a relatively low number of participants in the study (15 participants divided into five teams). 
However, as argued above, the level of segmentation of the protocols becomes unmanageable if it is much 
larger. A possible remedy is to code for reasoning in larger segments, which has already been done 
elsewhere (see Galle, 1996b; Lloyd & Scott, 1994).  The	limited	participation	of	the	facilitators	in	the	idea	generation	could	potentially	affect	the	results.	To	account	for	this,	analyses	of	the	data	excluding	idea	episodes	in	which	the	facilitators	contributed	to	reasoning	were	completed	and	showed	no	significant	differences	and	the	same	directionality	in	the	results.		
To capture the different reasoning types, the coding scheme is dependent on reasoning made verbally 
explicit to ascertain reasoning patterns. Hence, the study captures reasoning as it is put forward in an 
argumentative form (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1973) in a group setting 
without instructional priming to think-aloud, which, we argue, is representative of the actual verbal 
reasoning taking place within groups of people in design activity (Rittel, 1987). Future research might 
attempt to instruct participants to clarify all their arguments to assess whether any individual covert 
reasoning arguments may be made explicit upon instruction.   
6 CONCLUSION 
An empirical study of the reasoning types used in group idea generation for a design task was conducted 
with participants from industry. Five teams were recorded, and the transcribed protocols were analysed 
using a coding scheme for determining the presence of ideas and reasoning types in verbal data in more 
than 5 500 segments. The study aimed to empirically analyse verbal reasoning patterns through the 
analysis of protocol data. 
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The results suggest that reasoning in design activity across hundreds of ideas follow a general pattern of 
abductive-deductive reasoning. The study found that abductive reasoning is concentrated in the first part 
of ideas, functioning to frame and propose solutions. Deductive reasoning, concentrated in the latter two 
parts of ideas, was the most frequent across all idea parts, functioning to explore and concretise the 
solutions proposed by the initial, often abductive, framing. Inductive reasoning, the least frequent of the 
reasoning types, did not appear to have a pronounced effect in idea generation activity. At the individual 
idea level, reasoning patterns were found to be disorderly but to contain elements of abductive-deductive 
patterns. 
The study found that reasoning instances are understood as chains of inference that accumulate and create 
understanding of approaches to address overall problem settings in design, indicating that the analysis of 
reasoning patterns at a micro-level of design activity holds potential to advance the understanding of 
design activity and be applied to develop support tools and methods given future research. 
This study contributes to an understanding of design activity at a micro-level in a real-world setting. From 
the protocol analysis of design teams, patterns of verbal reasoning during idea episodes were identified. 
The study is novel in that it proposes an approach to analyse reasoning patterns at the micro-level of design 
activity, allowing for the identification of central abductive-deductive patterns of reasoning from empirical 
data, paving the way for several strands of future research. 
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